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**ON THE US CONSTITUTION  
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE QUR'AN AND THE MEDINA COVENANT**

by

Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, Ph.D.

Minaret of Freedom Institute

The interminable discussions over the compatibility of democracy with the Islamic nomocracy (called the *shari`ah*, an Arabic word meaning “path”) have included profound discussions of constitutionalism.<sup>1</sup> This paper exploits the premise that the discussion of the compatibility of democracy and constitutionalism with Islamic law would benefit from an assessment of certain aspects of the United States Constitution in the light of the Qur’an<sup>2</sup> and the covenant of Medina, which has been called “the first written constitution.”<sup>3</sup> The Medina Covenant strongly influenced subsequent Muslim political practice, and we may search it for insights on constitutional issues.

This paper is by no means an exhaustive comparison of the U.S. Constitution against the Qur’an and the Medina Compact. Rather, it is an exploration aimed at demonstrating the kinds of insights a comparison among these documents may suggest. Accordingly, the constitutional topics selected are those which the author or the commentators on earlier drafts of the paper perceive that the Islamic sources suggest an assessment.<sup>4</sup> This paper should be taken as an invitation for future studies with more systematic comparisons. In addition to rational inference from the text of the Qur’an and the Medina Compact, I shall draw on the views of the companions of the Prophet expressed in the leading books of hadith. Analogously, the views of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic on constitutional matters are articulated in the Federalist Papers.<sup>5</sup>

We shall begin by reviewing the Medina Covenant. We shall then evaluate the goals of the Constitution as expressed in the preamble. After that we shall explore a variety of topics from the main body that lend themselves to the examination here proposed, in particular, the roles of the branches of government under separation of powers, the role of elections in succession of the head of state, the penalty for treason, the existence of slave trade and racism, the republican form of government, provision for amendment, religious tests, and the Bill of Rights. Finally, we consider the Madisonian arguments on how the U.S. Constitution may be considered a model for avoiding *fitna*.

That Muslims attach great significance to their organization as a political community can be seen in the fact that the Muslim calendar is dated neither from the birth nor the death of the Prophet, but from the establishment of the first Muslim polity in the city-state of Medina in 622 C.E. Until the founding of Medina, the Arabs had no state to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty....” The custom of the Arabs at that time was that those too weak to protect themselves became clients of a protector (*wali*). Muhammad, himself an orphan, had been brought up under the protection of his uncle Abu Talib. After the death of Abu Talib (619 C.E.), Muhammad received an invitation from the feuding Arab tribes of Yathrib to govern there. Once in Yathrib, the Prophet entered into a compact with all its residents whether they had accepted Islam or not. Even the Jews of the outskirts of the city subscribed to the covenant. Henceforth the city would be known as Medina, “the City,” short for “*madīnat-an-Nabī*,” the City of the Prophet. Let us consider the provisions of this seminal document.<sup>6</sup>

After invoking the name of God, the compact opens with an assertion of the unity of the community: “In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. This is a covenant given by Muhammad to the believers and Muslims of Quraysh [i.e., the immigrants from Mecca], Yathrib, and those who followed them, joined them, and fought with them. They constitute one Ummah [community] to the exclusion of all other men.” This is reminiscent of the opening clause of the

Preamble to the U.S. Constitution in that it suggests the formation of a more perfect union of the clans in Medina akin to the more perfect union of the states sought by the American Constitution. Further it is a call for a union based not on common origin, but of commitment to a common cause. That the ties of the constituent groups are not dissolved, but are integrated into the greater network, is underscored by the specific naming of the constituent groups in identical wording.<sup>7</sup>

One is tempted to assume that the common cause in the case of the Medina Covenant is a much broader one than in the case of the American Constitution. After all, the former is based on a common religion and the latter only on a common political commitment, i.e., to the Constitution itself. The next few sentences seem to support this supposition, speaking in terms of “believers.”<sup>8</sup> However, the text immediately broadens the scope of the union with an assertion of inclusion of the Jews of Medina: “Any Jew who follows us is entitled to our assistance and the same rights as any one of us, without injustice or partisanship. This Pax Islamica is one and indivisible. No believer shall enter into a separate peace without all other believers whenever there is fighting in the cause of God, but will do so only on the basis of equality and justice to all others.”<sup>9</sup> In order to understand this passage one must understand that in Islamic terminology Jews who believe in God and the last day are, by definition, Believers. The Qur’anic word for a believer (*mu’min*) is used in the Arabic text of the Covenant to refer to the Jews<sup>10</sup> who are therefore included in the *Pax Islamica* (as al-Faruqi has translated the text). The text details the implications of this union for military expeditions and networks of alliances, acknowledging the belligerence of the Quraysh, and declaring Muhammad to be the final court of appeal.<sup>11</sup> These passages establish the Medina city-state as sovereign, with the right to declare war, negotiate treaties, and adjudicate internal disputes.

The Covenant then posits a defense of the rights of the innocent in the constituent communities, and the rights of the constituent communities in a kind of federalism of religious communities, and a requirement of joint defense.<sup>12</sup> Apart from reiteration and further elaboration of the principles detailed above, the rest of the Covenant contains three additional points. All

parties to the Covenant are required to defend Yathrib if it is attacked; any party may demand a cessation of hostilities (unless the war is against the Muslim religion *per se*); and the “covenant shall constitute no protection for the unjust or the criminal. Whoever goes out to fight as well as whoever stays at home shall be safe and secure in this city unless he has perpetrated an injustice or committed a crime.”<sup>13</sup>

The departure of this covenant from the tribal institutions of protection that it replaced is remarkable. Although the general submergence of family-based protection into a broader civil institution was not new, the hard-wired religious pluralism was an innovation. This seems to anticipate the free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment. On the other hand, there is no resonance at all with the disestablishment clause. Notwithstanding its total commitment to freedom of religion<sup>14</sup> the Medina Covenant is unabashedly a Muslim document and unapologetically removes defense of the religion from the veto-power given the non-Muslims under the compact to veto continuation of a war against an aggressor.

Now that we have some familiarity with the Medina Covenant, let us consider its implications for the basic notion of a manmade constitution. Muhammad’s willingness to found the Medina city-state on a written compact implies the permissibility of founding a nation on a written constitution. Further, the fact that he held the consent of the constituent groups to the Covenant necessary to its implementation implies the permissibility of the ratification requirement for the Constitution.

We have already noted the harmony between the Constitution’s goal of union of the states as mentioned in the Preamble and the objective of union of the clans as stated in the Covenant. The other goals listed in the preamble would also appear to be appropriate for Islamic constitutionalism. Certainly the repetitive references to justice in the Covenant (and the demands for justice found throughout the Qur’an) commend the establishment of justice.<sup>15</sup> The establishment a final court of appeals in the person of the Prophet attests to the goal of “domestic tranquility.” The provision of a common defense is indisputably an objective as the demand for

the defense of the city-state by all parties demonstrates. Promotion of the general welfare may be inferred, but the Covenant seems to go further with the clauses requiring attention to the particular welfare of the members of the community. This leaves only the goal of securing “the blessings of liberty,” which will be addressed later.

Despite the harmony of goals, there is certainly one particular in the Constitution at odds with Islamic jurisprudence. The Qur’an quite emphatically demands that judgment must be according to what God has revealed (e.g., 5:45). The whole body of Islamic jurisprudence is based on the understanding that law is that which God has decreed and which man must learn, either directly through revelation or through scholarship, rather than something man may invent. Accordingly, the *shari`ah* (as the Divine Law is named) was the subject of legal scholarship throughout the classical period of Islamic civilization (622-1492). It was not developed by an elected legislature but a “completely free and unorganized republic of scholars.”<sup>16</sup> While nothing in Islam prohibits the election of a legislature *per se*, the very nature of *shari`ah* as divinely mandated would imply that the mission of any such legislature ought to be restricted to setting rules in the discretionary areas between the *halâl* (permitted) and the *harâm* (*prohibited*). That is, a legislature may set speed limits and the like, but could not declare that which was *harâm* to be *halâl* nor that which is *halâl* to be *harâm*.<sup>17</sup>

One may argue that Islamic law may accommodate a role for the legislature in making official the research of the scholars, according to divine law. In that case, legislation would aim to fulfill the Qur’anic commandment to engage in *shûra*, or mutual consultation. “That which is with God is better and more lasting: (It is) for those ... who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation...” (42:36-38). Since scholars may disagree in their inferences, an elected legislature could adopt particular interpretations, guided not by popular whim, but rather by the popularity of particular interpretations. The anger in such a role for the legislature is that it may stifle the diversity of legal interpretations historically found in Islamic law by the recognition of multiple schools (among the Sunni) or multiple mujtahids (among the Shia).

The way of reconciling these notions may be to restrict legislative authority to those cases where the domestic tranquility required choosing from among the options offered by the various schools. The Islamic jurists of the classical era were unanimous in their agreement that it was wrong for rulers to impose one school, even their own, over the others. They preferred to let people choose from among the schools as to which they would adhere. Thus, a contract among Muslims might state that it would be adjudicated according to Hanafi law as opposed to Maliki law, as modern American contracts state that they will be adjudicated according to Delaware law as opposed to Maryland law.

The importance of this preference for individual discretion over a standardized legal system can be understood best when one thinks of the implications of a legislature adopting law for the religious minorities discussed earlier. As in the Medina city-state, a Jewish minority in a Muslim state could be ruled by its own laws provided that they did not come into conflict with the Muslim residents. Thus, the Christians in Muslim society have always had access to wine (which they need for their sacrament) despite the fact that it is prohibited in Islamic law. A body that interpreted and applied law according to popular will might transgress against that protection of minority rights. While it might be objected that a popular body that sees itself as a mere interpreter of divine law should not engage in such activity, it is in the nature of elected bodies to sacrifice principle for popularity.<sup>18</sup> Thus, while the Constitution grants all persons the right of habeas corpus and the right to confront their accusers, the United States Congress nonetheless passed the “Counter-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996” which allows immigrants suspected of terrorism to be held without charge, without knowledge of any evidence against them, and with no right to confront their accusers. Immigrants lack the political clout to counter the charges of “softness on terrorism” that legislators would have confronted if they had failed to pass the legislation. Muslims might think that the Constitution lacked an adequate guard against this excess of democracy. We may be concerned that such a weakness facilitates legislative violation of the command: “O ye who believe! stand out firmly for justice as witnesses

to Allah even as against yourselves or your parents or your kin and whether it be [against] rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both. Follow not the lusts [of your hearts] lest ye swerve and if ye distort [justice] or decline to do justice verily Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do” (4:135).

The American president is head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In Medina the Prophet combined these offices with the position Sole Justice of the Supreme Court. Shall we conclude that the American Constitution gives too little authority to the Chief Executive? The answer to this question depends upon whether the Prophet expected his successors as heads of state to have all the responsibilities he did as Prophet. This has been a hotly debated question in Muslim jurisprudence. It is an article of faith in Islam that Muhammad was the last Prophet. His successors as head of the temporal society should not be expected to fill the shoes of a man directly guided by God. The Prophet seems to have supported this point when he said “The learned are the heirs of the Prophets....”<sup>19</sup> Muslim jurists have taken this to support their own role distinct from that of the rulers. Some scholars, notably those who have been influenced by Plato’s concept of the philosopher-king have taken a different view, arguing that the Supreme Leader of the ummah must himself be a scholar rather than that any separation of powers is envisioned. The Qur’an provides no prescription here. It contains no details on the structure of Muslim governance, merely commanding the believers to “obey ... those charged with authority among you” (4:59). It does not specify how this authority is to be distributed. The Medina Covenant is silent on the matter. The governors appointed by the Prophet were expected to serve as final courts of appeal. This fact suggests that permitting the head of state to serve as chief justice is acceptable under Islamic law, especially since the general rule of Islamic law is that that which is not prohibited is permitted, but this does not mean that it is mandatory. It is a purely subjective opinion on my part, but I would like to think that the Qur’an’s emphasis on mutual consultation implies an appreciation the merits of checks and balances and, therefore, that a separation between the executive and the judiciary is meritorious.

This silence of the Prophet on the separation of powers was not problematical in Muslim history. Muslims readily accepted that the chief justice was a separate person from head of state, although they generally gave the head of state the right to overrule the chief justice. (Even in America, the President can grant clemency to a criminal that the court has condemned [Article II, section 2]. However, the President cannot condemn someone the Court has acquitted.)

Neither the Qur'an nor the Medina Covenant deals with the question of succession. Upon the death of the Prophet Muslims divided over the question of succession, and that divide forms the two main branches of Islamic scholarship, the Sunni (about 90% of Muslims) and the Shi'a (accepted by about 10% of Muslims). Sunni scholars have concluded that the Prophet intentionally left the field wide open for the community to provide for its own mechanisms for selecting its leaders. Thus the first four leaders (Caliphs) of the *ummah* after the Prophet Muhammad were selected by a variety of methods. Most interesting to our present study was the selection of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph. He was chosen by a mechanism quite analogous to the Electoral College. A meeting was held of the community's leaders who considered how to deal with the crisis of leadership caused by the Prophet's death. They negotiated among themselves as to who were the best candidates and settled on the Prophet's close friend (and the first person outside the Prophet's family to embrace Islam), Abu Bakr. Although the electors were not themselves elected as the Electoral College members are, they were undisputed leaders of the community. The decision ended up unanimous among the leaders present. However, not all the community leaders were present. The absence of the Prophet's cousin Ali and those who might have pushed for his election was the source of the rift in the community that later developed into the Sunni/Shi'a split. At the time, however, Ali himself accepted the election of Abu Bakr. Thus, on the Sunni account, the election of the first Caliph demonstrates the acceptability of the Electoral College as a method of electing the head of state.<sup>20</sup>

Apart from the ambiguities concerning a chief justice separate from the chief executive, there can be no doubt about the acceptability of a separate judicial branch in Islam. The Qur'an



specifically refers to judges, and, like the U.S. Constitution, puts no constraint on them other than good behavior (2:188). Thus, the Muslim jurists have generally held that judges should be appointed for life in order to assure their independence from the executive branch. The Constitutional method of appointing judges by the chief executive is also consistent with Islami law. Muhammad himself appointed judges, and the requirement of ratification by the Congress is consistent with the Islamic practice of *shura*, or consultation mandated by the Qur'an (see 3:159).

The definition of treason is an interesting issue. Discussions of Islamic law by non-Muslims (and all too often by Muslims, as well) suffer from confusion between the concepts of apostasy and treason. The majority view is that the death penalty applies only to treason during warfare, including providing aid and comfort to the enemy, rather than mere conversion. According to the Constitution [Article III, section 3], treason consists only "in levying War against [the United States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort." That Muhammad shared this view can be seen in his life in which he never executed apostates except when they battled against the Muslims or propagandized against them.

The Constitution's silence on the slave trade is paralleled by an ambiguity on slavery in Muslim law. The National Archives and Records Administration, on the authority of George Mason, explains the Constitution's failure to end the slave trade as the result of "a bargain" between delegates from South Carolina and Georgia and those from New England. "In exchange for the New Englanders' support for continuing slave importation for 20 years, the southerners accepted a clause that required only a simple majority vote on navigation laws, a crippling blow to southern economic interests."<sup>21</sup> Muslim law did not ban slavery completely, but it strongly urges the freeing of slaves, requiring it as a means of atonement in cases ranging from manslaughter (4:92) to a futile oath (5:89) or an ill-considered divorce (58:3), and demanding that slaves be allowed to purchase their own freedom on the mere condition that "ye know any good in them" (24:33). The ransom of slaves is enumerated among the forms of preferred charity (2:177). Further, the Prophet (who himself never owned slaves)<sup>22</sup> forbade abusive treatment of

slaves and required their captors to feed them the same food they themselves ate and to dress them in the same quality of clothing. Therefore, while the Prophet would sympathize with the political forces that made compromise on slavery necessary, he would be disappointed that the Constitution did not contain protections for the dignity and rights of slaves and some mechanisms by which they could seek to obtain their freedom.

More troubling to Muslims is the racism inherent in the Constitution. The various forms of discrimination that were left to the states until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment (if not the civil rights acts of the 1960's) would be intolerable under Islamic law. For that matter, despite the tolerance of Islamic law for the institution of slavery, the association of slave status with a particular racial group is unacceptable. Slavery was a status conferred on prisoners of war for their acts of war against the community, not a status inherent in one's racial or ethnic origins. The Prophet is reported to have said: "Indeed there is no excellence that an Arab possesses OVER a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab. Nor is there (an excellence) of a white man over a black man, or a black man over a white man, except by TAQWAA."<sup>23</sup>

The Constitution guarantees each state a republican form of government (Article IV, section 4). This entire essay may be viewed as a commentary on the Islamic perspective on a republican form of government; namely, that insofar as it allows for popular self-government within constitutional constraints, it is acceptable provided that those constraints are the outer limits of Divine Law. The larger question about whether the forms of government of subsidiary political entities should model that of the larger political entity to which they belonged is easily answered in the affirmative. It is reported that Muhammad would question the governors of the provinces to which he sent them as to how they would rule and would indicate his approval if they answered by the Qur'an, the practice of the Prophet, and their own judgment, in that order.

There was no provision for amending the Medina Covenant. To conclude that the possibility of amendment is impermissible in principle, however, would be hasty. The Caliph Umar had no problem with amending the procedures by which the Prophet had distributed lands

in conquered territories when he himself conquered Iraq. He engaged in such amendment only after consulting with the subsidiary leaders. One must assume that he would not have done this if he did not believe the Prophet would approve of the possibility of changing such a fundamental procedure to accommodate changing conditions. Only the Qur'an itself, being the eternal Word of God, is beyond amendment. Any manmade document, being contractual, could contain procedures for its own amendment.

Some analysts view the American Constitution not as a strictly contractual document, but as a human attempt to formulate a political structure that might respect uninvented Divine or Natural Laws. The Medina Covenant was also, in effect, such a document, notwithstanding the prophetic office of its principle founding father (25:7). The application of revealed principles is not a trivial matter, so the amendment process of the Constitution is fitting recognition of human fallibility. While any suggestion that the Qur'an should be subject to an amendment process would constitute a challenge to its divine Authorship, such concerns are misplaced if applied to the Medina Compact or the U.S. Constitution.

The prohibition of any religious test by the Constitution is an interesting matter. Muhammad posed no religious tests in the Medina Covenant. Subsequent Muslim scholars have only required that the head of state himself (because of his symbolic status as head of a *Muslim* state) must be a Muslim. Thus Jews and Christians have held high positions in Muslim governments (including Grand Vizier who has sometimes been the true head of the government as sometimes the prime minister is the true head of government even though the king is still the head of state in the modern world). The Constitution's requirement that only someone born on American soil may be President is even more restrictive since (a) the President is both head of state and head of government and (b) anyone can change his religion, but no one can alter his place of birth.<sup>24</sup> The American restriction is one of geography while the Islamic restriction is one of declared commitment to the source of the law.

The Bill of Rights merits discussion for there is no doubt that many of the Founders considered it a necessary part of any constitution. What is the Islamic assessment of the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights?

We have already noted the inclusion of free exercise of religion in the Medina Covenant. Muslims have generally viewed the other half of freedom of religion, its disestablishment from the state, as neither necessary nor desirable. The Prophet also favored freedom of speech and encouraged his people to speak out, but Muslims never have extended the concept to include lewd expression, because public lewdness is expressly identified as punishable by the Qur'an (e.g., 4:15-16). Of course American standards of public lewdness today are much more liberal than in Muhammad's day. For example, the Qur'an specifies a flogging for anyone who commits adultery in front of four witnesses. If any state today punished anyone for committing adultery in public, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly determine it to be a case of cruel and unusual punishment. This was not the case at the time the Constitution was written, however, and as late as c. 1848 a "Published Senate Document on Flogging in the Navy" lists the punishment for "Being naked on the spar deck" as nine lashes.<sup>25</sup> It was not until the 1850s that Congress banned the practice.

Some Muslim countries make blasphemy a punishable offense (e.g. Iran<sup>26</sup> and Pakistan<sup>27</sup>), although it is not an offense under the U.S. Constitution. Political speech, however, (except for treason as described above) was protected. Thus, when an otherwise historically insignificant woman challenged a decree of Umar (586-644) when he was Caliph he not only made no objection to her disputing with him, but also accepted her correction.<sup>28</sup> Despite all this, some interpret the Qur'an's clear denunciation of *fitna* (a term which may mean trial, persecution, oppression, temptation, enticement, intrigue, sedition, dissension or civil strife)<sup>29</sup> to mean that dissent from a position previously adopted constitutes a punishable crime. Obviously this depends on one's interpretation of the term *fitna*. If, like Yusuf Ali (on whose translation of the Qur'an we have been relying), we understand it to mean oppression, then it is intolerance of

dissent that constitutes a capital crime. The Prophet himself is reputed to have said that diversity in his community is a blessing. The Qur'an, too, quotes the prehistoric prophet Shu'aib warning against intolerance of his own dissent by reminding his people of the fate that met peoples who been intolerant of their dissenting prophets before them: "And O my people! let not my dissent (from you) cause you to sin lest ye suffer a fate similar to that of the people of Noah or of Hud or of Salih nor are the people of Lut [Lot] far off from you" (11:89).

As to the Second Amendment, the defense of Medinan society was by an armed populace. Since the city defense was by a citizen army, the issue of quartering soldiers (Third Amendment) does not arise, but the strict Islamic protection of privacy (see discussion below) would presumably require a ban on quartering soldiers in private homes in peacetime. Advocates of gun control would no doubt argue that in modern times defense is best effected by a professional army and that as such the presumption does not apply to a settled community not in danger of foreign attack. Opponents could point to Switzerland where a citizens' army exists today despite the fact that the country has not been attacked for over a century. In short, a debate over whether Muslims should support the second amendment or not would mirror the debate over the merits of the amendment itself.

The issue of due process (Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eight Amendments) was dealt with earlier. Except for the Khwârij, Muslims have always supported due process, but they are divided over the particular processes enshrined in the Constitution. Are juries as a protection against corruption or an unwelcome injection of nonexperts into a process that calls for experts? On the other hand the right to subpoena witnesses seems clearly in accord with the Qur'an's calls for witnesses not to withhold evidence.<sup>30</sup> The injustice of delayed trial is self-evident.

The question of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a controversial subject. Most modern Western non-Muslims deem the death penalty as well as the Qur'anic punishments for theft, fornication, and perjury to be cruel and unusual by modern standards. While the imposition of the death penalty for adultery is not found in the Qur'an, cutting off the hand for

theft, or a lashing for fornication and perjury are. Modern sensibilities find such punishments unpalatable (although Sir Thomas Moore defended bodily mutilation as more civilized than imprisonment).<sup>31</sup> The usual argument made in favor of these punishments, that because they are effective deterrents, they would rarely be imposed, only complicates the issue. If they are so effective as to be rarely imposed, that makes them all the more unusual. (Unlike incarceration, which is so ineffective that almost one percent of the American male adult population is now in prison.)<sup>32</sup> As for the death penalty itself, the Qur'an limits its application to cases of murder and *hirābah* (war against society, 5:32-33).

The Constitutional prohibition on the seizure of private property without just compensation is covered by the Qur'anic prohibition on theft. If that is not clear enough, the Prophet emphasized it in his Farewell Pilgrimage address when he said: "Nothing shall be legitimate to a Muslim which belongs to a fellow Muslim unless it was given freely and willingly. Do not, therefore, do injustice to your own selves."<sup>33</sup>

This leaves the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. In the interests of economy I shall somewhat oversimplify the issue by focusing on unenumerated rights. The explicit mention of unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment and the implicit reference to them in the Tenth Amendment are reflections of the fear of many of the founders of the American Republic that the enumeration of certain rights might give the false impression that only those rights enumerated are recognized by the Constitution. As we have seen, the Islamic concept that anything not prohibited is permitted demonstrates that there are unenumerated rights. While a discussion of what those rights may be would take us into the realm of extra-Qur'anic sources of Islamic Law, it is interesting to note that one aspect of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments consistent with the concept of *shari`ah* is the implicit acknowledgement that rights are not granted by the Constitution but merely recognized by it, however partially or imperfectly. Since Muslims believe that all rights come from God, this is an almost Islamic element of the Bill of Rights.<sup>34</sup>

The only unenumerated right to obtain recognition by the Supreme Court in American Constitutional history is the right of privacy, initially recognized in a case on contraception and mentioned in the dispute over abortion. While the very fact that the Court has recognized a right of privacy as an unenumerated right has been challenged by, among others, Judge Robert Bork,<sup>35</sup> the right of privacy is very well established in Islamic law. Not explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, the right to privacy was established much earlier in the history of Islamic law than in the history of American law. The right of privacy within one's own home is guaranteed in the Qur'an (24:27), and early in Islamic law the principle was established that people who consumed wine in private could not be prosecuted if the evidence was obtained by violating the right of privacy. "The texts prohibiting spying and searching out people's faults apply equally to the government and to individuals."<sup>36</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the Islamic view on contraception is consistent with the prevailing American law in the matter. The issue of abortion has become controversial in the modern era. Apparently under the influence of the debate among Christians, some Muslims now claim that the Qur'anic prohibition to infanticide (19:151 and 81:8) implies a prohibition of abortion. However, the Qur'an implies<sup>37</sup> and a *hadith* explicitly states<sup>38</sup> that God does not give the fetus a soul until the fourth month of pregnancy. Combine this fact with the view of some Islamic classical-era scholars that the life of the mother takes precedence over the life of a fetus, and the classical position appears to be remarkably consistent with Justice Blackmun's majority position in *Roe v. Wade* that in the first trimester privacy concerns prevail while state interest in regulation becomes tenable in the later stages of pregnancy.<sup>39</sup>

Our assessment of the U.S. Constitution in the light of the Qur'an and the Medina Covenant has been largely favorable, although with some qualifications. The real issue from the standpoint of Islamic law is that any human constitution must be subordinate to Divine Law, and that human legislation should never be allowed to contradict the divine law although it may be required to interpret and, perhaps, even to supplement it. In all those areas in which the Qur'an

itself is silent, like the forms and structures of popular government, the U.S. Constitution is a viable model for an Islamic government, whether or not it is the best such model.

While the Constitution seems to give more power to the general public to enact legislation than conforms to the traditional Muslim practice of developing legislation by legal scholarship rooted in revelation, it does not necessarily follow that the U.S. Constitution would be unacceptable to Muslims. On the contrary, if the people of the United States were Muslims, they could choose to operate under the U.S. Constitution to enact laws consistent with Islamic law and even to amend the Constitution as might be necessary to bring it into line with Islamic principles. No doubt Muslims would disagree as to what amendments are necessary. As Muhammad is no longer with us to arbitrate such disputes, they would have to rely on sound scholarship to resolve such questions.<sup>40</sup>

There are also some Muslims who maintain that the Constitution in essence is opposed to the Qur'an because it is a document founded on the premise of human freedom that denies man's essence as the servant of God.<sup>41</sup> My understanding of the intention of the Founding Fathers is that the Constitution's purpose is to secure men's freedom from other men, not from God. The signers of the Declaration of Independence, at least, appealed to, rather than resented, the "laws of nature and Nature's God."

Any belief that human legislation can rid man of the laws of Nature and Nature's God is one that, I believe, the Prophet would reject as a self-defeating form of wishful thinking. In this respect, we find that the American Constitution is a human endeavor to avoid *fitna* (as we have defined it above). Indeed, we find James Madison's eloquent description of violent factionalism as *fitna* could easily be addressed to the state of the Muslim world today (and indeed throughout too much of its history):

Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but



by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true.<sup>42</sup>

Madison argues that by the same token by which we do not trust individuals to be the judges of their own case in disputes over such matters as religion and politics for fear of bias or corruption, the different factions of legislators are only “advocates and parties to the causes which they determine.”<sup>43</sup> Madison’s rejection to the argument that “enlightened” statesmen are above such difficulties applies as well to “pious” statesmen: “It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.”<sup>44</sup> Since we cannot remove the causes of *fitna*, Madison argues that the federal republican system will control its *effects*.

Madison’s arguments, in their strongest form, are that a federal republican system with a separation of powers and a difficult-to-change constitution offer the best protection from *fitna* of the majority by the minority or vice versa. From the Muslim point of view, such a constitutional mechanism offers hope for an Islamic renaissance when it is implemented within the framework of an Islamic worldview held by a majority of the voting population. This study thus suggests the powerful appeal to Muslims of the concept of an Islamic republic.

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<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Azizah Y. al-Hibri "Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy," *Case W. Res. J. Int'l Law*. 24 (1992) 1-27.

<sup>2</sup> All quotes from the Qur’an cite surah and verse from the translation of Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur’an: Text Translation and Commentary* (Elmhurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc., 1987).

<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Hamidullah, *The First Written Constitution in the World: An Important Document of the Time of the Holy Prophet* (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1975). Whether Dr. Hamidullah is correct or not is debatable. Earlier candidates for this title like the code of Hammurabi or the Ten Commandments are basic laws rather than constitutions. On the other hand the Medina Compact falls short of the U.S. Constitution

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as a document intended to generate a detailed system for the generation of a body of laws. I believe that the distinction of the Medina Compact is that it was a constituting document in the same manner as the Mayflower Compact was, which some have argued was a precursor to the formation of the U.S. Constitution. While it may be grandiose to call either of those compacts constitutions, I think it is fair to say that the participants in both compacts, by their willingness to found their respective polities on such manmade agreements, demonstrated their acceptance to the general principle of founding a nation on a written constitution. It is from this basis that I dare to speculate on Muhammad's views on the American Constitution.

<sup>4</sup> The author is particularly grateful to the Joshua Stein who originally suggested this paper, to N. Mahmood Ahmad, and to an anonymous *AJISS* reviewer.

<sup>5</sup> *The Federalist Papers* (1/3/2001) <http://memory.loc.gov/const/fed/fedpapers.html> (accessed 8/6/03).

<sup>6</sup> The translation that follows is that of Isma'il al-Faruqi from his translation of Muhammad Haykal's *The Life of Muhammad* (North American Trust Publications 1976), pp. 180-183.

<sup>7</sup> "As was their custom, the Muhâjirûn [i.e., immigrants] from [the tribe of] Quraysh are bound together and shall ransom their prisoners in kindness and justice as believers do. Following their own custom, Banû `Awf are bound together as they have been before. Every clan of them shall ransom its prisoners with the kindness and justice common among believers.... [The text here repeats the same prescription concerning every clan and house of the Arab tribes of Medina] The believers shall leave none of their members in destitution without giving him in kindness what he needs by way of ransom or bloodwit [i.e., compensation for wrongful death]." *Ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>8</sup> "No believer shall take as an ally a freedman of another Muslim without the permission of his previous master. All pious believers shall rise as one man against whosoever rebels or seeks to commit injustice, aggression, sin, or spread mutual enmity between the believers, even though he may be of their sons. No believer shall slay a believer in retaliation for an unbeliever; neither shall he assist an unbeliever against a believer. Just as God's bond is one and indivisible, all believers shall stand behind the commitment of the least of them. All believers are bonded one to another to the exclusion of other men." *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>10</sup> "The Jews are a community of Believers (Mumin) along with the Muslims." Hamidullah, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> "In every military expedition we undertake our members shall be accompanied by others committed to the same objective. All believers shall avenge the blood of one another whenever any one of them falls fighting in the cause of God. The pious believers follow the best and most upright guidance. No unbeliever shall be allowed to place under his protection against the interest of a believer any wealth or person of the Quraysh. Whoever is convicted of killing a believer deliberately but without righteous cause, shall be liable to the relatives of the killed. Until the latter are satisfied, the killer shall be subject to retaliation by each and every believer. The killer shall have no rights whatsoever until the right of the believers is satisfied. Whoever has entered in to this covenant and believed in God and in the last day shall never protect or give shelter to a convict or criminal; whoever does so shall be cursed by God and upon him shall the divine wrath fall on the day of judgment. Neither repentance nor ransom shall be acceptable from him. No object of contention among you may not be referred to God and to Muhammad—may God's peace and blessings be upon him—for judgment." Haykal, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>12</sup> "As the Jews fight on the side of the believers, they shall spend of their wealth on a par with the believers. The Jews of Banû Aws are an ummah alongside the believers. The Jews have their religion and the Muslims theirs. Both enjoy the security of their own populous and clients except the unjust and criminal among them. The unjust or criminal destroys only himself and his family. The Jews of [here the document lists the various Jewish clans]—to all [,] the same rights and privileges apply as to the Jews of Banû Aws. The clients of the tribe of Tha`libah enjoy the same rights and duties as the members of the

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tribe themselves. Likewise the clients of the Jews, as the Jews themselves. None of the foregoing shall go to war except with the permission of Muhammad ... though none may be prevented from taking revenge for a wound inflicted upon him. Whoever murders anyone will have murdered himself and the members of his family, unless it be the case of a man suffering a wrong, for God will accept his action. The Jews shall bear their public expenses and so will the Muslims. Each shall assist the other against any violator of this covenant. Their relationship shall be one of mutual advice and consultation, and mutual assistance and charity rather than harm and aggression. However, no man is liable for a crime committed by his ally. Assistance is due to a party suffering an injustice, not to one perpetrating it. Since the Jews fight on the side of the believers they shall spend their wealth on a par with them. Yathrib shall constitute a sanctuary for the parties of this covenant. Their neighbors shall treat them as themselves as long as they perpetrate no crime and commit no harm.” Ibid. pp. 181-182.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>14</sup> It is important to remember that some of the clients to whom the Medina Covenant granted equal rights and privileges would have been polytheists.

<sup>15</sup> The references are too numerous to cite. An exemplary instance is: “O ye who believe! stand out firmly for justice as witnesses to God even as against yourselves or your parents or your kin and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for God can best protect both. Follow not the lusts (of your hearts) lest ye swerve and if ye distort (justice) or decline to do justice verily God is well-acquainted with all that ye do.” (4:135)

<sup>16</sup> S.D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts Through the Ages* (New York: Schocken Books, 1964).

<sup>17</sup> “But say not for any false thing that your tongues may put forth ‘This is lawful and this is forbidden’ so as to ascribe false things to God. For those who ascribe false things to God will never prosper” (16:116).

<sup>18</sup> While one might wonder whether Muhammad might think Muslims above that kind of pandering, one need only look to the Qur’an’s description of the psychological type it calls the munafiq, a word usually translated as “hypocrite.” Only God knows whom the hypocrites are: “When thou lookest at them their exteriors please thee; and when they speak thou listenest to their words. They are as (worthless as hollow) pieces of timber propped up (unable to stand on their own). They think that every cry is against them. They are the enemies; so beware of them. The curse of God be on them! How are they deluded (away from the Truth)!” (63:4)

<sup>19</sup> Sunan Abu Dawud #3634.

<sup>20</sup> Shi`a scholars not only reject the election of Abu Bakr in lieu of Ali, but deny that the Prophet selected no successor. They point to a number of Prophetic traditions that they claim proves that it was the Prophet’s intention that Ali should succeed him. Thus, they reject the entire electoral process. One must add that this Shi`a critique would only apply to the period during which one of the “Imams” (Ali or one of his eleven successors) were present. Modern day Iran, a Shi`a country, allows for the popular election of its president in the absence of the Hidden Imam.

<sup>21</sup> National Archives and Records Administration, “A More Perfect Union: The Creation of the U.S. Constitution: An Introduction” (8/13/2003) [http://www.archives.gov/exhibit\\_hall/charters\\_of\\_freedom/constitution/constitution\\_history.html](http://www.archives.gov/exhibit_hall/charters_of_freedom/constitution/constitution_history.html) (accessed 8/13/03).

<sup>22</sup> Occasionally someone would make a gift of a slave to the Prophet. He raised one such young man as his adopted son and married a woman given to him. The latter gave birth to his only son, who died in infancy.

<sup>23</sup> Amaam 'Abdul-'Azeez Ibn Baaz, *Naqd Al-Qawmiyyat-ul-'Arabiyyah* trans. by Abu Ramsayah and edited by al-Manhaj (<http://www.al-manhaj.com/Page1.cfm?ArticleID=53>), quoting Sahih Ahmad 5/411. See also the popular but unauthenticated variation in, R. Marston Speight, *God Is One: The Way of Islam*. New York: Friends Press, 1989, p. 50.

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<sup>24</sup> It is noteworthy that questions were raised regarding George Romney's eligibility to run for President in 1968 as he was born in an American embassy or consulate in Mexico to American citizens. Due to his early withdrawal from the race for unrelated reasons, the Constitutional issue remains unsettled. The author of this essay has a more than academic interest in this question as he was himself born on free waters on an American ship to an American father.

<sup>25</sup> Naval Historical Foundation, "Naval Historical Foundation Lashed with Flogging Question," (2/17/01) <http://www.mil.org/navyhist/what%27s~2/question.htm> (accessed 9/3/01).

<sup>26</sup> Robin Wright, *In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1989), p. 198.

<sup>27</sup> Amnesty International, "Pakistan: The Death Penalty," (1/9/96) <http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ASA330101996> (accessed 9/3/01).

<sup>28</sup> See, e.g., Hassan al-Turabi, "On the Position of Women in Islamic Society," (7/11/2003) <http://www.islamfortoday.com/turabi01.htm> (accessed 8/12/03)

<sup>29</sup> "Tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter" (2:217).

<sup>30</sup> "O ye who believe! stand out firmly for Allah as witnesses to fair dealing and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to Piety: and fear Allah for Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do." (5:8)

<sup>31</sup> Thomas More, *Utopia*, p.1.

<sup>32</sup> Page M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck, "Prisoners in 2002," *Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin* NCJ-200248 (7/23/2003) p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> Muhammad Husayn Haykal, *The Life of Muhammad*, trans. Isma'il Ragi A. al-Faruqi (North American Trust, 1976), p. 487.

<sup>34</sup> The association of natural law with divine law in the minds of the Founding fathers is explicit in the Declaration of Independence, which lays the moral basis for establishment of the Constitution. The signers of that document declared their intention that Americans would "assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them...."

<sup>35</sup> Bork argues that the Court found the right of privacy not to be a separate right under the Ninth Amendment, but in "the shadow" of other enumerated rights. He sides with the legal positivists who deny natural or divine law completely.

<sup>36</sup> Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1980).

<sup>37</sup> The Qur'an states that the period of total dependency of a child on its mother is 30 months (46:15) including 24 months of nursing (2:233 and 31:14). The six months of total dependency without nursing would be the last two trimesters of pregnancy. The first trimester isn't counted as it is before ensoulment, a separate act from conception (32:8-9).

<sup>38</sup> Muhammad Muhsin Khan, *Sahih Bukhari*, 4:430 (Medina: Crescent Publications) pp. 290-291.

<sup>39</sup> "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth

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Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy....

“On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree.... At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute.... The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.”

<sup>40</sup> “The superiority of the scholar over the worshipper is like that of the full moon on a clear night over the rest of the stars. Indeed the scholars are the inheritors of the Prophets and the Prophets do not leave behind them the gold coin nor the silver coin as inheritance, they leave only knowledge behind as inheritance. So whosoever acquires it, acquires a huge fortune.” Abu Dawud's *Sunan*, Book of Knowledge, 3:316, #3641.

<sup>41</sup> See, e.g. Imam Jamil al-Amin, *Revolution by the Book: The Rap Is Live*, Beltsville, MD: Writers Inc., Intl., 1993.

<sup>42</sup> James Madison, “The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection,” Federalist #10 (11/23/1787) [http://memory.loc.gov/const/fed/fed\\_10.html](http://memory.loc.gov/const/fed/fed_10.html) (accessed 8/12/03).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.